1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Indochina AMI
Malaya ANI

thinly settled areas of Laos, Cambodia, western Cochinchina, and the mountainous regions of Annam and Tongking are comparable to the Outer Islands. Moreover, the Annamese is as reluctant as the Javanese to leave his native village and settle among people who do not speak his language nor follow his customs. The few colonization experiments[4] that have been made in Indochina in recent years have brought out many of the same lessons as did the early trial period in the Indies.

> The necessity was felt for organizing this movement carefully, preferably by groups of families from the same village headed by their chiefs, who alone are capable of maintaining the cohesion necessary if the Tonkinese are to settle down to their ordinary way of living immediately after their establishment in the settlement areas.[5]

Here, too, the need for population adjustment has become so pressing that resettlement measures will have to be started on a large scale after the war.

Industrialization also has been advocated for Indochina. In contrast to the Philippines and the Indies, Indochina has most of the basic raw materials for heavy as well as for secondary industry. Mercantilistic considerations, however, deterred France from industrializing the country. It was not until 1938 that growing unemployment and population pressure finally led the government to initiate a compromise program of promoting secondary industries.

Migration across international boundaries in Southeastern Asia was, and probably will be, negligible; almost all such migrants who had before the war entered the countries encircling the South China Sea came from China or India, the principal exception being the Javanese in Malaya. Most of the latter entered the country as plantation laborers but ultimately settled on the land and engaged in rice cultivation. This development was beneficial to both countries; on the one hand the laborers and their families did not return to their overcrowded villages in Java and on the other hand they increased the rice production of Malaya. The Malays accept the Javanese readily as both are Moslem and of the same racial stock. There would be no reason to advocate a settlement of Javanese in the Philippines or Thailand or of Annamese in Malaya or Borneo, or of Filipinos in Cambodia or New Guinea so long as there was sufficient suitable agricultural land available within the boundaries of the native countries of the prospective pioneers.

In the past, Southeastern Asia did not to any great extent enjoy a free exchange of ideas and information. Identical problems were often tackled without the benefit of knowledge gained from the experience of a neighbor-

[4] International Labour Office: Labour Conditions in Indo-China, 1938, pp. 216–241. See also Brévié: "Conseil supérieur de la colonisation," 1938, pp. 715–756; and Services du Protectorat: "Activité colonisatrice du Tonkin," 1938, pp. 757–779.

[5] International Labour Office: *op. cit.*, p. 236.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

000 So in extending the practice, the kings of Pegu or Ayuthia need not be suspected of mere obsequiousness, although their motives in sending missions were diplomatic as well as commercial. Later (the dynastic histories record) the incursions of the Portuguese and other barbarians into Southeast Asia caused an interruption of the tribute, but before this dilatory vassals had occasionally been reminded of their manners by punitive expeditions from the Dragon Throne.[1]

After the establishment of the Ming dynasty, the emperor Yung Lo[2] and his successor dispatched to the West a series of great expeditions of up to sixty-two ships filled with as many as 37,000 soldiers. They got as far afield as Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, the east coast of Africa,[3] Calicut in India, the east coast of Java, and Ceylon. They went as armadas and returned as argosies. The most famous of the commanders was the Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho. Either he or his associate Grand Eunuchs carried out seven voyages between 1405 and 1433, bringing the glory and, when necessary, the terror of the Imperial Ming name to all the potentates of the archipelago and far beyond.[4] A prince of Ceylon and a local chief in Sumatra who failed to submit to the Emperor's power were seized and carried off to China; a Chinese pirate with a lair in the archipelago who tried to combine humble submission to the Emperor with theft of the tribute consigned to his Imperial Majesty was run to earth and taken to Peking for a lingering execution.

●167 Other, more orthodox, Chinese traders had in the interim been feeling out on their own *in partibus infidelium* in search of gain. They went down to the Nanyang with the northeast monsoon about February and returned with the southwest monsoon in April. From about the thirteenth century they began to form settlements in such places as Tumasik, or Old Singapore, Malacca, and Java. In the earlier days they lived where they chose, but in more modern times these overseas Chinese were relegated, it must

[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Chinese Discovery of Africa* (London, Probsthain, 1949) (in the press) who says, 'Recognition by the Chinese Court gave "face" to these minor Kings. Also, it was the primitive form in which officially-sanctioned trade could be carried on. As early as the Han dynasty the Chinese sent ships overseas to collect precious objects.'

[2] In Giles's romanization Yung Lê.

[3] Duyvendak, op. cit.

[4] Cheng Ho did not personally take part in all the voyages—certainly not in the second (1407–9).

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

be confessed, to what were often sorry ghettoes. Those who settled intermarried with the native women and laid the beginnings of a new race whose culture remained Chinese. Individuals rose to positions of eminence in the native courts, and one Chinese, Peja Jummeraad, was chief justice in seventeenth-century Siam.

It was the arrival of the Europeans, however, which created the conditions favourable to Chinese settlement on a larger scale. The Spanish, the Dutch, and the British subdued large areas and established the security necessary for profitable trade and a bearable life. Nevertheless, friction between themselves and the ruling race in the Philippines and later in Java resulted in Chinese rebellions and the large-scale massacre of this people, showing that the security was only provisional; but they were soon back again in their old numbers as if nothing had happened. Broadly speaking, the Chinese became the middlemen, the intermediaries between the Europeans and the native peoples. Their popularity with the ruling race fluctuated according as they were valued for their services or feared for their political or economic power; the nature of their function was such as to bring them increasingly under native suspicion.

It is here that we should refer briefly to the case of the Chinese in Burma which was apart from the main course of Chinese migration—apart, that is, before the maritime arrivals of the nineteenth century. The trade route by way of the Shan States had been open at least from the time of the Mongol dynasty. The staple import from China for centuries was silk, raw and manufactured, just as the staple import from Burma into China was cotton. The study of the commerce of this route is one of the most fascinating features of this survey, for the change in the nature of the commodities about the middle of last century is a striking index to the advance of the industrial West. Before this time China was the factory of Southeast Asia, and, indeed, of countries far remote. Chinese textiles, destined in great degree for Mexico, poured into the emporium of Manila: not only manufactured silk and cotton nankeens were loaded on to pack-mules and carrying-coolies for transport over the passes of Yunnan, but also iron *quallies*, or pots, and brassware. By the second half of the nineteenth century the flow of goods changes, and it is Manchester cottons, Bradford woollens, and Birmingham pots and pans which go to China, and the flow of nankeens and *quallies* the other way has practically ceased. It is

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

like watching a stream change its watershed. But remember at the same time that it was a stream, not a river, for the overland route never gained the importance the British hoped and the principal routes of commerce continued to be by sea.

We return now to the main story of Chinese migration: the seasonal influx of a few Chinese traders and labourers cannot compare with the mass movement we are about to describe. It needed the nineteenth- and twentieth-century capitalistic imperialism to open up the colonial countries for the supply of raw materials to the Western industrial machine. Chinese labour has now found its fullest scope in the tin mines and the rubber plantations of South-east Asia; Chinese artisans were in demand for the urban handicrafts; Chinese merchants and shopkeepers flocked in to the centres to expand the retail trade. In some countries the number of Chinese was multiplied several times; in Siam they were said to have passed he two million mark by the 1930s; in Indonesia at this period a million and a quarter were distributed through Java, Sumatra, and the Outer Islands; in Malaya they reached their greatest numbers, nearly two and half millions, by 1941 and outnumbered the Malays for the first time. In bringing in Chinese for Malaya's mines and plantations and opening the doors to Chinese traders, the British had created for themselves a political problem of the first magnitude and one that will loom large in our pages to come. This was the era of the 'battalions' as distinguished from the small expeditions, and, long, long after the 'single spies'.

Meanwhile another evolutionary process was at work in the Far East. Peoples were becoming aware that they were separate culture-groups as well as being (as they thought) separate blood-groups—namely, that they were nations. For Japan, insular, centralized, with a compact social system, the transition from race-consciousness to nation-consciousness was not a difficult one: for China it was otherwise. Separated immemorially by mountain and river, by lake or marsh, the prefectures, the districts, and the villages were self-absorbed. At most a common dialect would give them a qualified sense of brotherhood: usually it was the family that was the largest social unit. At the same time they were aware, of course, that they were all members of the Blackhaired Race and not to be confused with the barbarian devils—but that was scarcely more of a bond of union than being human is to the modern world of *homo sapiens*. In 1840 British troops on their way to the 'Opium

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

heart to the terrorists in their 'hide-outs' in the almost limitless jungles of Malaya.

Such is the outline of the story we shall have to tell. What, then, is the philosophy of this Chinese migration?

If they had been called upon to deal with the Chinese of Southeast Asia, the great historians would have treated it according to their enlightenment and the age they lived in. Gibbon, for example, if he were restored from the grave, would assuredly regard the activities of all modern Chinese as a progressive falling away from the Chinese Age of the Antonines, the dynasty of T'ang. It is unlikely that he would show any undue sympathy for the colonists who were so little steeped in the national culture. Mommsen would find no Chinese Caesar overseas, and would assuredly disdain these simple annals. Macaulay, brought back to life, most probably would have dutifully accepted the task of writing the history of the Chinese in the Nanyang were it imposed upon him, and he would assuredly have devoted his opening chapters to describing the squalid sufferings of the pioneer coolie in his blue trousers, rope-soled shoes, and broad-brimmed hat, his naked body sweating under a tropical sun, and more chapters to an imposing picture of his magnificent mansion,[1] his fleet of shining motor-cars, and (maybe?) his bevy of concubines after he had got on in the world.

But we must pass from this diverting speculation to an interpretation of our task stated in our own terms. It is to make actual an important and striking phenomenon of recent times, the overflow of the Chinese in large numbers into Southeast Asia, to demonstrate the problems caused by this overflow, and, if possible, to help place the general historian, the politician, the administrator, the diplomat, and the merchant in a state of mind congenial to a better understanding of the Chinese overseas. This understanding may suggest an approach to the practical questions of the area in the next decade or so which will benefit both West and East.

If one fact has impressed the writer of this survey more than another in the course of his study, it is the feebleness of the attempt made by the Colonial Powers and the indigenous Governments in this area to understand the overseas Chinese and their problems.

[1] The lesser, but less awestruck, Lytton Strachey would probably make a sly reference to the electro-plated vacuum cleaner or thermos flasks, for ornament and not for use, in the drawing-room of the self-same mansion.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1]

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4]

[1] 'The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

162
167

In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender,[2]

tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of
443 retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

•167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens. The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra.

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered

The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although

G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines based, however, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941 at least three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been designed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast subject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated. 167 In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and 177 to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the 175 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reas- 177 serted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino–Southeast Asia contacts.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42.

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2]

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

9-Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

167 they live amongst). The Laws of the Ch'ing dynasty, section ccxxv, are explicit:[1]

> All officers of government, soldiers, and private citizens, who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating the same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded. The governors of cities of the second and third orders shall likewise be beheaded, when found guilty of combining with, or artfully conniving at the conduct of such persons . . .

Thereupon ensues a long list of penalties, but the officials who had offended by allowing the emigration to occur were to be pardoned if they afterwards succeeded in securing the offenders and bringing them to condign punishment.

The Manchu policy was dictated largely by the consideration that emigrants from the disaffected south would almost certainly be anti-Manchu and, once out of reach of the Manchu officials, would undoubtedly be plotting among themselves and with their friends inside the country for the overthrow of the dynasty. Those who enlisted under Koxinga would be a case in point. And in maintaining this policy the officials were helped by the sentiment of the Chinese that all beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom were barbarians and were not to be consorted with. The law could never be enforced because economic stress and hope of gain were the more powerful forces, but the principle was held in theory until 1860 when it was disposed of in the treaties with foreign Powers, though the law was not actually repealed until 1894. The officials reaped a big harvest from it, for they collected large sums from returning immigrants as a price of inaction, and they also made levies on the same account on the families in China of emigrants overseas; for in China responsibility is a very far-reaching principle.

The attitude of the Government being as it was, it can readily be understood that little attention was paid to the misfortunes and persecutions of overseas Chinese. The massacre of the Chinese in the Philippines in 1603 and 1639, and in Java in 1740, caused no great concern to the Chinese Emperors. There are instances of reprisals in the Ming dynasty, but even these are few and far between.

[1] Sir George Thomas Staunton, *Ta Tsing Leu Lee; being the Fundamental Laws of the Penal Code of China* (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1810).

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

We shall see how the value of the foreign trade was too great an inducement for officials and others to ignore, and the profits to be obtained by the Chinese themselves when they made trading voyages led to connivance on the part of the Governors: in 1567 the Governor of Fukien allowed his provincials to go abroad to trade with all foreigners except the Japanese, who were the arch-pirates of the period and who ravaged the Chinese coasts. Traders had, however, to get licences to leave the country.

In 1717 the Emperor K'ang Hsi summoned those of his subjects who had been residing in foreign countries to return to their homes, but consented to pardon all who had been abroad since the beginning of his reign some fifty-six years before. His successor, Yung Cheng, allowed the inhabitants of the coast provinces to go abroad to trade under licence on condition that they subsequently returned home; but in 1728 he forbade those who were unlicensed to come back at all.

A proclamation by Ch'en Hung-mou, Governor of Fukien, in 1754, continues the story of the official attitude towards emigration:[1]

> . . . A large proportion of the maritime population of Fukien is beholden for its subsistence to trade beyond the sea. The southern seas having at an earlier period been closed to trade (by a law that) provided that all persons who had gone abroad before its enactment might return home within three years, but that no one should go abroad after its enactment should be allowed to return at all. In the fifth year of the reign of Yung Cheng (1727) this interdict was removed, and there has been, from that time, a movement of traders from the Inner Land abroad unceasing as the welling of a spring. Feeling, however, that there must be some who, with sea upon sea between (China, and) the distant (land where they were), could not have returned home within the appointed time, the late Governor-General, Hao, first in one memorial, and then in a second, moved His Majesty to allow such persons to return; which proposition was sanctioned. But in the 14th year of Ch'ien Lung (1749) there occurred the case of Chen I-lao. . . .

Chen I-lao was a native of the district of Lung-ch'i, who having unauthorizedly proceeded from Kwangtung to Batavia had become headman of the Chinese at that port, and had there collected duties on foreign trade. As he could not belong to the class of honest

[1] Sir Thomas Francis Wade, *Tzŭ Erh Chih*, Documentary Series (London, Trübner, 1867), gives the Chinese original of the proclamation and a translation on p. 33 of the Key.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

• 167 trader (says the proclamation), but was the sort of man who would be laying hold of some pretext or other to give trouble, as soon as this came out he was tried (by the Chinese authorities) and sentenced to banishment; and since then such traders who are still detained abroad, being filled by his trial with doubt and fears, have not ventured to return home.

> . . . the Governor, humbly reflecting [the proclamation goes on] that it is because of our Emperor's treatment of the natives and foreigners as one, that the trade of the foreigner is enabled to continue, as thread joined to thread, uninterrupted; that alike cherishing those from afar, and benefiting by his bounty the (native) merchant, his Majesty shows a consideration that leaves nothing untouched, did (as the records show) explain the matter in a memorial. . . .

The result of which was that those Chinese residing abroad, providing that their reason for not returning within the allotted time was 'the inability to close their accounts' were to be permitted to return to their homes and to bring with them any wives or concubines they had acquired abroad, together with their children.

This represents the situation until the First China War of 1839–42. The war has been stigmatized as the 'Opium War', and indeed opium was its occasion, but among the objects of the British was to force the Chinese Government to permit diplomatic contacts and to improve the insupportable conditions under which foreigners were required to trade. The Nanking Treaty which followed the war was unilateral: that is to say, the Chinese undertook to make concessions to the British without obtaining corresponding advantages. The Chinese gained no right to send consuls abroad, but at this time they did not want to do so. Treaty ports were established under the treaty, but the determination of the Chinese Government not to allow diplomatic intercourse led to a further war in 1858–60, in which Great Britain was partnered by France.

Morse[1] and MacNair[2] give in detail the history of how the Chinese were eventually brought to recognize the principle that their nationals had a right to emigrate. The Second China War was concluded by the Treaty of Tientsin. The French made their own separate treaty, and the Americans, though not participants in the war, also obtained a treaty of their own. The Chinese recognition

[1] See H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The Period of Conflict 1834–60* (London, Longmans, 1910) passim.
[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1925).

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

to the three Powers of the right of their people to emigrate took place about the same time (by the two conventions of Peking, 1860), but, owing to some complications and difference in procedure, the first incorporation of the principle in a treaty was in the Burlingame Treaty of 1870 with America when the Chinese Emperor 'cordially recognised the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration of aliens and subjects respectively from one country to another for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residence'. A similar principle was embodied in agreements with Great Britain and France, but the method of promulgation was to be by imperial decree to the high authorities in every province, who should issue proclamations within their jurisdiction. The first official recognition of the right of the Chinese to leave their homeland is found in these proclamations.[1]

It was but slowly that the Chinese began to see the advantages of having diplomatic and consular representatives in foreign countries where they had nationals or with which they had trading relations. The first permanent legation was established in London in 1877. The minister was accredited both to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo in the same year, and in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were established at various ports in the next decade or so.

But the sentiment of the Chinese against emigration persisted throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and it still persists. The popular attitude can well be illustrated by extracts from two American writers—the first referring to about the middle of the nineteenth century and the second to its last quarter:

[1] George F. Seward, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, Scribners, 1881), chap. vi, discusses the emigration of Chinese to the Nanyang and the question of their disposition to emigrate. His thesis is that, through growing northern influences and more amalgamation with northern stock, the people of the southern part of China are losing their migratory tendency. When they are not recruited, as for the more distant continents, they go only to nearby countries. Emigration to California was an episode only; the Chinese naturally go where the native peoples are less vigorous than they. In spite of great inducements held out to them, their numbers in the Dutch East Indies have remained small. During the same period in which Europeans changed the face of America, the Chinese in Java had made a lodgement only. They have not mongolized it.

This was written before the large-scale emigrations of the twentieth century, and the 'loss of migratory tendency' has certainly not been true so far as Southeast Asia is concerned. Nevertheless the thesis is worthy of consideration in the other respects.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

I

• 167 . . . if they [the Chinese emigrants] return with wealth enough to live upon, they are liable to the vexatious extortions of needy relatives, sharpers, and police, who have a handle for their fleecing whip in the law against leaving the country, although this clause has been neutralized by subsequent acts, and is not in force, the power of public opinion is against going.[1]

II

To the foreigner, acquainted with the experience of other lands in modern times, the simple, obvious, indispensable recipe for the relief of many of the ills to which the Chinese are subject, is emigration. . . . But this is an expedient which the Chinese themselves will never adopt, for the reason that it will take them away from the graves of their ancestors, to which, by the theory of Confucianism, they are inexorably linked. Generally speaking, no Chinese will leave his home to seek a fortune at a distance unless he is in some way driven to do so. His ideal in life is to be

'Fixed like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot.'

Generally speaking, no Chinese leaves his home not intending to return. His hope is always to come back rich, to die and be buried where his ancestors are buried.[2]

But in noting these impressions of competent observers we should bear in mind that they are speaking of China as a whole: the sentiment against emigration in the specifically emigrant communities of the Kwangtung and Fukien seaboard was certainly not great, if it existed at all: indeed there is reason to believe that, in the last few decades at least, they regarded themselves as having a privileged entrée to the good things that came from the Nanyang.

[1] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (London, W. H. Allen, 1883) i. 279.
[2] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1894) p. 165–6.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

•167
591

Here two distinct aggregations of Chinese live side by side—the non-emigrant and the emigrant community—from which a large proportion of the emigrants to the Nanyang are drawn and the income of whose families is (except under unusual circumstances such as the later war with Japan) augmented by remittances from their menfolk overseas. These two communities in a clear way illustrate many of the differences that distinguish the stay-at-home Chinese from those who have sought their fortunes abroad.

Judged from the natural and socio-economic facts, the non-emigrant community was (at the time of Dr Ta Chen's investigations) typical of farm life in south China. The principal occupation was the cultivation of rice, and this was supplemented by many subsidiary occupations, including poultry raising and fruit growing. After the harvest, men and women of the poorer classes picked up fuel and burned charcoal in the mountains for sale in the village market. It was a simple pattern of livelihood not differing in any essential from that of thousands of villages in any other part of rural China. The emigrant community, too, had a variety of occupations, but these did not yield them sufficient income to maintain their present style of living. To quote an experienced physician with Western training who had for many years resided in such a community: 'The children of the well-to-do emigrant families are well fed and clothed. They are easy-going and usually without a definite occupation. If by mischance the family's business in the Nanyang should be bankrupt, these people will be obliged to support themselves by begging.'[1] This statement was thought to be something of an exaggeration, but to bring out the variable factor in the life of an emigrant community. (There were, of course, also families with no sons abroad living in the emigrant community. In these families the pattern of livelihood was much the same as that in a non-emigrant community.)

Before proceeding with a summary comparison of these two sets of families, it is appropriate to remark that those who emigrated from China usually did so to improve their social status. They were, on the whole, therefore, drawn from the less prosperous families, and the process to be described was not merely that of subjecting identical social material to different influences.

In the non-emigrant community, out of 725 families studied, 650 were engaged in growing rice. One hundred and thirty of these owned

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. pp. 59, 60.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

the land they occupied, 280 owned part of it, and 240 rented all the land they used. Crop sharing was the most widespread form of tenancy, the crop usually being divided equally between the owner and tenant at harvest time. The farm holdings varied in size, a poor family occupying three or four *mow*, a middle-class family from eight to ten, and a well-to-do family about fifteen (2·5 acres). In the non-emigrant community about one-half were engaged in rice growing, 3·6 *mow* (0·6 acres) being the average per family. The poorest tilled one or two *mow*, those of the middle class seven or eight, and the well-to-do about ten. Proprietary farmers constituted about 1 per cent. of the total number of farmers, part owners about 5 per cent., and the remainder were tenants. Crop sharing also was the rule here, from two-fifths to one-half of the crop going to the landlord at harvest time.

Other occupations followed by the non-emigrant community included the timber business and the trade in incense sticks. Income was supplemented in some villages by planting a crop of wheat after the rice harvest, growing vegetables and sugar-cane, and rearing poultry, and the girls and married women spent part time on drawn-thread and embroidery work. Emigrant families added to the remittances they received from overseas in several ways. Trade attracted a great deal of the interest and energy even of families that depended mainly on agriculture for their livelihood. For the returned emigrants, residence abroad had usually meant a change of occupation according to their inclination and the opportunities available in the foreign community. A larger proportion were engaged in trade after their return to China than before leaving for the Nanyang, that is to say about half the total—shop assistants (there were no apprentices among them), merchants, and pedlars being added together. This was due to the greater opportunity for trade offered in the Nanyang than at home, and the ambitious Chinese naturally chose the opening with the greatest chances of profit. Nevertheless, there was still a large number of labourers among those who returned home, representing those who were labourers before they left and those who had struggled to emancipate themselves from working with their hands and had failed to do so. Farming showed a startling decline as an occupation among the returned emigrants, having fallen to last place.

Among the subsidiary occupations followed by the emigrant community were those in which women and girls could add to their

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about SS $10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant families to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad.

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned.

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

167 ●
178
582
593

custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt.

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for.

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary system of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

771
.167

the two religious systems); whereas Yao, a ghost, is from primitive ancestor worship via Confucianism. In one emigrant community in south Fukien Dr Ta Chen's investigators found that of 224 persons questioned, 154 expressed belief in Shen and Fu, 60 had no religious preferences, 5 believed in Christianity, and 5 seemed to be wavering between acceptance and rejection of Shen and Fu. Comparative popularity would, we may be sure, depend largely on results; for, like the Roman gods, a Chinese god is expected to render a return for respect accorded and the offerings made to him. A Roman observed his rites with scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, expecting that if he did not the gods would make it an excuse to wriggle out of the bargain, and the Chinese regard their gods in much the same spirit.[1]

Amongst the most popular goddesses in the Buddhist pantheon both in China and overseas is Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, 'she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals—she who looks down on the world and hears its cries'. She is the counterpart of the Taoist goddess T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, Holy Mother, queen of heaven, and she is credited with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mary. Kwan Yin was originally the Buddhist male god, Avalokiteswara, who changed his sex to female some centuries after his arrival in China.

Another popular god among the overseas Chinese is Kwan Ti, the god of war.

Each craft or guild has its own patron saint—Wu Ku Lao Yeh for farmers, Chiao Sheng Lao Yeh (whose festival is on the 7th of the 5th moon) for carpenters, Shui Hsin Lao Yeh for incense-stick makers, Kwan Ti, the god of war, in his capacity of god of wealth, for tradesmen, and T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, the Taoist queen of heaven, for fishermen and sailors (but overseas her name is changed to Ma Tsu (Ma Chew Poh)), which is also popular in Amoy. In many Cantonese houses the image of the household god of the earth, T'o Yei Shan or Tei Chu, is placed *underneath* a table! The god is not worshipped in Hokkien households.

In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, the Chinese of the Nanyang have special deities

[1] See Ta Chen, op. cit. chap. x, and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. vi. There is an instructive article, 'Chinese Contemporary Cults', by Clarence Burton Day in the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vi, no. 3 (May 1947), which covers a number of the gods and heroes worshipped in south China and the Nanyang.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu.

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro-

[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedans exist in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their numbers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

276
167

nounced opium to be 'a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purposes of foreign commerce only'. A debate in the House of Commons on the eve of the First China War (the 'Opium War') of 1839 showed that the great majority of the members of Parliament were prepared to countenance the opium traffic as a necessary evil, but a few enlightened voices were lifted against it, including that of Macaulay. The fact, however, that opium-smoking was a vice to which the Chinese were addicted made it valuable as a source of revenue to the Governments of Southeast Asia. The usual method of obtaining this revenue was to farm out the sale of the drug to private persons or firms. Administrators (including Raffles) had grave misgivings regarding the effect of opium-smoking on the health of the Chinese community, but it was not until about the beginning of this century that the various Governments began to take steps towards controlling the sale of the drug.

A Commission appointed in 1907 in the Straits Settlements to ascertain the extent to which opium-smoking was indulged in, whether its prevalence was on the increase, and what means should be taken towards its restriction or suppression, made a report to the following effect:[1]

The habit in the case of the majority of smokers in Malaya was acquired during residence in these parts. The labour in Malaya was mostly drawn from the impecunious farmer class, and the ruling price of chandu in China, though low compared with the price in Malaya, was sufficiently high to place it beyond their reach while they were in their native land. Moreover, the influence of the elder over the younger members of the families of China, one of the most striking characteristics of Chinese family life, was removed in Malaya, and thereby a powerful deterrent to the acquisition of the opium habit disappeared. Nor was the view commonly held among the Chinese of Malaya that the habit was injurious—indeed the general sentiment was to the exact contrary. It was regarded as a panacea for many common ailments and was often recommended by Chinese doctors. These facts, in the opinion of the Commissioners, largely contributed to the commencement of the habit.

in India, China, Persia, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Cocaine is derived from an entirely different plant, the coca leaf, grown in South America and Java in particular.

[1] *Report of the Opium Commission* (Singapore, 1908), vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Those *habitués* who were questioned said that they had started to smoke 'as a remedy for sickness', 'as an antidote to sorrow', or 'from bad example'. Brothels were a common place in which Chinese learned to smoke.

The Commissioners summed up their views as to the motive for the habit in these words: 'We are firmly convinced that the main reason for taking to the habit of smoking opium is the universal tendency of human nature to some form of indulgence.' Or, less sententiously expressed, they did it because they liked it!

A man was less likely to become an inveterate opium-smoker than a drunkard.

As to the evil results of opium-smoking the Commissioners took a moderate view. As regards the physical evils, with the exception of medical practitioners who held strong views opposed to opium, the medical witnesses were practically unanimous in expressing the opinion that opium-smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if the indulgence were carried to an excess, there was (so said the witnesses) no organic change in the body. The general impression, however, was that in tasks requiring severe physical exertion the smoker was not equal to the non-smoker; in the case of the skilled artisan, opium-smoking made little or no difference to his relative value; opium-smokers and non-opium-smokers in an industry worked the same number of hours and earned the same wages.

These views (in the experience of the writer) represent the general views of European administrators who, on the whole, incline to consider opium-smoking as a symptom rather than a cause of misfortune. Education and improved living conditions in the last forty years have had more effect in decreasing the number of smokers than any other factor.

While the Commission was unwilling to recommend prohibition (which in any case would be possible only by international agreement, as the poppy was then cultivated in India, China, Turkey, and Persia), it recommended the abolition of the opium farmer and the establishment of a Government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of chandu.

The international control of the manufacture and sale of deleterious drugs has a very extensive literature of its own, and all that we need do here is to refer to the main facts.[1]

[1] See Herbert L. May, 'Narcotic Drug Control', *International Conciliation*

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AFI

children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1

C 668 S 167 178 668 641 this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

S 565 554 641 In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese S 668 579 have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no C 668 Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese
China AFI

APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

C S 167

THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

C S 167 162

Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1942). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

[p. 682]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast As[illegible] AL1
Chinese
China AFI

C S 167 162

the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

C S 167

For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

[1] The analysis is not available.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1

C S •167

were repatriated, and 39,164 are shown as having absconded or are otherwise not accounted for.

Deaths from this tragic happening could not, therefore, have been fewer than 25,000 and may well have reached 50,000. The death-roll from air-raids and associated causes is variously estimated as being between 5,000 and 10,000; while the number executed is placed at between 10,000 and 20,000.[1]

Repatriation of Displaced Persons to China

From:	*Returned during UNRRA programme (Sept. 1945–30 June 1947)*	*Awaiting repatriation (approx. number on 30 June 1947)*
British North Borneo	15	1,200
Burma	46	50
India	0	562
Indochina	1	280
Italy	171	0
Malayan Union	22	100
Indonesia	692	1,217
New Britain	750	0
Philippines	6,587	0
Siam	65	0
Singapore	300	100
Solomon Islands	0	9
Still 'unscreened' (i.e. examined to decide whether or not they are genuinely 'displaced persons')	..	3,000
	8,649	6,518

[1] M. V. del Tufo, *Malaya: a Report of the 1947 Census of Population*, p. 29.

1 [See 26: del Tufo, AN/ Malaya -- Analyst]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chinese
Indians

APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines	..	..	Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century. 162 167

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and moneylenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

[p.691]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese; Indians
India AWI

S
162
463

After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

I
167
S
167
464

In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their [476] leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 167 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
•167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except
[166] for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Caledonia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese Indians

464 668 563 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compensated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political [167] privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 668 563 167 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller numbers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining. More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 668 563 167 468 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so doing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigration. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expensive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of government-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial relationship which would result from general economic development in the world and specifically from the new role that China and India would inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, divided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gangster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

3

LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear.

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan.

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re-

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

727 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese
●167 laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads.
464 Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The
[464] only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "inde-
466 pendence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until
466 the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war
[167] aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A
[166] certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems
[464] not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in.

727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated.

727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas.

727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese,

727 464

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region.

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization.

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

POPULATION

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

162 361 167

factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely. 361 162 167

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.